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BRIEF ARTICLE
Vantage perspective in analogue trauma memories: an experimental
study
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aBehavioural Science Institute, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, the Netherlands; bPro Persona Research, Overwaal
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ABSTRACT
Vantage perspective during recall is thought to affect the emotionality and
accessibility of distressing memories. This study aimed to test the effects of vantage
perspective during recall on memory associated distress and intrusion
development. An adapted version of the trauma film paradigm was used in an
experimental design with three conditions. Participants were asked to listen to
eyewitness reports of car accidents (e.g. Trauma Analogue Induction) and imagine
the scenes vividly using mental imagery. Afterwards, they were asked to recall the
most distressing scene from field perspective, observer perspective, or to recall a
neutral image from observer perspective (control condition) (e.g. Trauma Analogue
Recall). Recall from field perspective resulted in higher negative mood, state-
anxiety, and a higher number of short-term intrusions compared to the observer
perspective condition and control condition. Negative mood and state-anxiety were
mediators in the relationship between vantage perspective and intrusions. In
comparison to observer perspective, field perspective increased the amount of
short-term intrusions as a result of higher levels of negative mood and state-anxiety
after memory retrieval. Future research on the interaction between vantage
perspective at recall and negative mood and anxiety effects is warranted.
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After a traumatic event, people can re-experience the
event in the form of distressing intrusive memories, or
intrusions (APA, 2013). Intrusions are defined as “recur-
rent, involuntary, and intrusive distressing memories
of the traumatic event” (APA, 2013) and more
specific as “multi-modal mental pictures of highly
detailed sensory impressions of an event including
sights, sounds, feelings, and bodily sensations that
come into consciousness uncontrollably and
unwanted” (Krans, Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2009).
One can recall (trauma) memories from different
“vantage perspectives”. In an observer or third-
person perspective, you see yourself in the memory,
as if you are a spectator. In a field or first-person
perspective, you recall a memory as seen through
your own eyes (Nigro & Neisser, 1983).
The presence of intrusions is a prominent symptom
of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (APA, 2013).
Studies have attempted to assess the exact relationship
between vantage perspective and intrusion develop-
ment. It has been theorised that recall fromobserver per-
spective leads to fewer intrusions because it reduces the
emotional impact of the memory, whereas recall from
field perspective increases it (e.g. Berntsen & Rubin,
2006; McIsaac & Eich, 2002). PTSD patients who recalled
a traumatic memory from field perspective indeed
reported higher emotional distress associated with the
memory than in observer perspective (McIsaac & Eich,
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2004). Interestingly, adopting an observer perspective
was associated with reduced physiological reactivity
during retrieval (Wisco et al., 2015).
According to the Self-Memory-System model of
autobiographical memory (SMS model) (Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), vantage perspective influences
the self-relevance of autobiographical memories. Recal-
ling a memory from an observer perspective is viewed
as a strategy to disconnect the event from the self
(Robinaugh & McNally, 2010). As a result, memories
become less accessible (i.e. fewer intrusions). As such,
it is possible that observer perspective leads to fewer
intrusions because it makes the memory less self-rel-
evant. Indeed, encoding a(n imagined) stressful event
from observer perspective was shown to be related
to less self-relevance compared to encoding in field
perspective (Mooren, Krans, Näring, Moulds, & van
Minnen, 2016). Yet, results are mixed. For example,
recalling a trauma memory from an observer perspec-
tive has also been found to result in higher avoidance
and PTSD symptoms (Kenny et al., 2009). Also, avoidant
individuals were more likely to remember their trau-
matic memories from an observer perspective (Kenny
& Bryant, 2007). Yet, other studies found no difference
at all in PTSD symptoms (Mooren et al., 2016; Robi-
naugh & McNally, 2010) or in emotional distress (Robi-
naugh & McNally, 2010; Wisco et al., 2015) related to
vantage perspective of trauma memories.
One possible explanation for these mixed findings
may be methodological. Retrospective methods of
assessing vantage perspective can lack reliability and
preclude causal conclusions. Therefore, the present
study experimentally manipulated vantage perspec-
tive during recall to assess the effect of vantage per-
spective on emotional distress and intrusions. This
way, it was also possible to control for the content of
the memory. An analogue trauma paradigm based on
mental imagery was used to induce intrusions (Krans,
Näring, Holmes, & Becker, 2010). This method is
effective in manipulating vantage perspective and
inducing temporary analogue trauma symptoms
(Mooren et al., 2016). Although this method might be
less ecological valid than other analogue trauma induc-
tions (e.g. virtual reality or film clips), it has been shown
to be effective in manipulating vantage perspective
when recalling a stressful event (Mooren et al., 2016).
Possibly, this manipulation might even be stronger
than the film induction (Krans et al., 2010).
In the present study we manipulated vantage per-
spective during memory consolidation (i.e. in the first
hours after the event). This allowed us to study which
vantage perspective is most adaptive when retrieving
distressing images directly after the encoding. As such,
our study is specifically relevant in the context of
mental health prevention settings and acute psychologi-
cal help directly after trauma (e.g. debriefing pro-
cedures). Previous studies have demonstrated the
detrimental effects of certain types of debriefing directly
after trauma (Mayou, Ehlers, & Hobbs, 2000). Perhaps the
perspective that is applied during the debriefing deter-
mines whether it prevents the development of PTSD
symptoms. Observer perspective may be functional
during memory consolidation, but dysfunctional after
the memory has already been consolidated and is
being retrieved for further emotional processing (e.g.
by serving an avoidant function; Kenny & Bryant, 2007).
In the current study, theeffect of vantageperspective
on negative mood, state-anxiety, self-relevance and
intrusions was investigated in three experimental con-
ditions (field, observer, and control). A condition was
added to control for the use of observer perspective,
because it was expected that maintaining an observer
perspective would place a different demand on the par-
ticipant than adopting a field perspective (e.g. possibly a
higher cognitive load, which can affect recall quality;
Kearns & Engelhard, 2015). Based on the studies of
McIsaac and Eich (2002) and Berntsen and Rubin
(2006), it was predicted that recalling distressing mem-
ories from field perspective would elicit the highest
levels of negative mood, state-anxiety, and intrusions
in the short term, compared to the observer perspective
and control groups (hypothesis 1). In terms of the under-
lying mechanism, we theorised that field perspective
would result in more intrusions compared to the obser-
ver perspectivebecause itmakes thememorymore self-
relevant (hypothesis 2) and increases the emotional
impact of the memory (hypothesis 3). In order to test
this, a mediation analysis was conducted. It was hypoth-
esised that negative mood, state-anxiety, and self-rel-
evance would mediate the relationship between
vantage perspective (field and observer) and intrusions.
Method
We report how we determined our sample size, all
data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures
in the study.
Participants
Eighty-five female university students volunteered for
participation. The following exclusion criteria were
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assessed with the M.I.N.I. (Sheehan et al., 1998): panic
attacks (current), panic disorder (current/lifetime),
PTSD (current/lifetime), major depressive episode
(current/lifetime), psychotic episode (current/life-
time), blood phobia, history of fainting, and signifi-
cant experience with road traffic accidents either
themselves or by close family members or friends
(Krans et al., 2010). These exclusion criteria were
adhered to for ethical reasons in relation to the
content of the Trauma Analogue Induction. Partici-
pants received course credit for participating. All par-
ticipants were informed about the procedure by a
written informed consent prior to the experiment,
but were kept naive with respect to the hypotheses.
Their age ranged from 18 to 36 years (M = 21.27
years, SD = 2.98). The study was approved by the
ethics committee of the Radboud University
(ECG20120910055).
Materials
Trauma analogue induction
Participants listened to an eyewitness report of four
scenes (11 min 42 sec) of real-life road traffic acci-
dents, developed by Krans et al. (2010). The report
consisted of background sounds of the original film
clips and a verbal description by an actress playing
a journalist at the scene taking notes with a voice-
recorder. The report contained explicit descriptions
of the injured victims, the setting in which the acci-
dents took place, and emotional responses of the
journalist.
Trauma analogue recall
Participants in the observer perspective condition
were instructed to recall their most distressing
scene from an observer perspective (“… as if you
are watching yourself take part in the situation”)
and verbally describe the image from a third-person
account (“I see myself…”). Participants in the field
perspective condition were instructed to recall the
scene “… as if you are there, seeing what is happen-
ing, looking through your own eyes” and verbally
describe the image from a first-person account (“I
see the car…”). Participants in the control condition
were asked to recall a neutral memory of having
dinner the previous day from an observer perspec-
tive. This neutral-observer condition controlled for
the demands of holding observer perspective in
mind.
Control measures
Individual differences
To assess individual differences in the use of mental
imagery in daily life, the 12-item Spontaneous Use of
Imagery Scale was administered (SUIS; Reisberg,
Pearson, & Kosslyn, 2003). Answers were rated on a
5-point Likert scale (1 = never appropriate, 5 = always
completely appropriate). Internal consistency of this
questionnaire is satisfactory (Reisberg et al., 2003; α
= 0.63 in our sample). The Dutch version of the
State-Trait-Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; 20 items each,
4-point scale from 1 to 4) was administered to assess
trait-anxiety (van der Ploeg, 1980). Internal consist-
ency of the STAI-T is satisfactory (α = .76 in our
sample).
Demand and compliance
The statement “I have often been unable (or forgot-
ten) to report my intrusions in the diary” was rated
on an 11-point scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (comple-
tely) (Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004) to assess
compliance with the intrusion diary instructions. In
addition, participants were asked about the perceived
goal of the study with an open-ended question.
Manipulation checks
Trauma analogue induction
Subjective vividness, distress, and attention in regards
to the eyewitness report were rated on 11-point Likert
scales (from 0 to 10).
Trauma analogue recall
Vantage perspective of the recalled memory was
assessed with a 6-item questionnaire using a 7-point
scale (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely; McIsaac & Eich,
2002). Questions were: (1) What percentage of the
total recall time were you able to maintain the
vantage perspective? (2) How strongly did you main-
tain the vantage perspective? (3) How easy was it for
you to maintain the vantage perspective? (4) To
what degree did the vantage perspective influence
your recollections? (5) How rich in detail is your
memory? (6) How rich in emotion is your memory?
Experimental measures
Emotional impact
The effect of recalling a stressful memory of the eye-
witness report (e.g. Trauma Analogue Recall) (field
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and observer perspective condition) or a neutral
memory (control condition) on negative mood and
state-anxiety was examined. Negative mood was
assessed with a 5-item questionnaire (MoodQ; 11-
point scale from 0 to 10; Holmes et al., 2004) measur-
ing happiness (reversed), fear, horror, depressed
mood, and anger. The Dutch version of the STAI-S
was administered to assess state-anxiety. Internal con-
sistency of the STAI-S is satisfactory (α = .76 in our
sample).
Self-relevance
Participants rated how self-relevant they considered
their recalled image (e.g. Trauma Analogue Recall)
on an 11-point scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (comple-
tely), with the question “Please indicate the relevance
of your recollection for you as a person”.
Intrusions
Intrusions of the Trauma Analogue Induction were
recorded in a diary during the seven days after the
experiment (Holmes et al., 2004). Intrusions were
defined as “spontaneously occurring images that can
take the form of words and phrases (‘verbal’), or
mental pictures (‘visual’)”. In this study, only intrusions
with a visual component were analysed since verbal
intrusions do not contain vantage perspective.
The 15-item Impact of Event Scale self-report
version was included (IES; Horowitz, Wilner, &
Alvarez, 1979) as an additional measure of intrusions
(8 items). Items were rated on a 5-point scale from 0
(not at all) to 4 (very much). Internal consistency has
been reported as satisfactory (Sundin & Horowitz,
2002; in our sample α = .74).
Procedure
Participants first read and signed an informed consent
form and were screened for exclusion criteria. Partici-
pants who were eligible to participate were presented
with a demographic questionnaire and the MoodQ,
STAI-S, STAI-T, and SUIS. Next, all participants received
a short imagery training in applying field perspective
(procedure by Holmes, Coughtrey, & Connor, 2008).
Then, all participants listened to the eyewitness
report (e.g. Trauma Analogue Induction) whilst ima-
gining the scenes from the trained field perspective.
Afterwards, participants rated the distress and vivid-
ness of, and attention for their imagery, and com-
pleted the MoodQ and STAI-S. Next, participants
were asked to close their eyes and recall a specific
scene from the report that they found the most dis-
tressing in their instructed vantage perspective, and
to verbally describe this image to the experimenter
(e.g. Trauma Analogue Recall). Participants in the
control condition were asked to recall a neutral
memory of having dinner the previous night from an
observer perspective. The MoodQ, STAI-S, self-rel-
evance rating and the vantage perspective questions
were administered. Next, participants received instruc-
tions on how to use the intrusion diary. They were
required to write down each intrusion the moment
that it occurred and to check the diary at a fixed
time every day for missing entries. After one week,
participants returned for a follow-up session in
which they were asked to hand in the diary, fill in
the diary compliance rating, the IES- intrusion scale,
and the question about the perceived goal of the
study. Finally, all participants were debriefed and
thanked for their participation.
Results
Statistical approach
There were no multivariate outliers but one univariate
outlier (more than three standard deviations from the
mean) in the diary measure of intrusions (field per-
spective condition) was identified and adjusted
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). One participant was
excluded from the analyses because she experienced
a car-accident two days after the first session. Seven
participants were excluded from all the analyses
because their attention rating was extremely low
(score of≤ 3) or their diary compliance was low (≥
4). Scores of≤ 5 on attention and compliance were
excluded (see Mooren et al., 2016). An a priori power
analysis using G-power indicated that a sample size
of 90 participants was required to obtain a statistical
power of 0.8 with an effect size of .30. In total, we
included data of 24 participants in the field perspec-
tive condition, 26 in the observer perspective con-
dition, and 27 in the control condition.
Intrusions (diary) were analysed using negative
binomial regression with log link because of positively
skewed distributions. The remaining variables were
analysed with analysis of variance (ANOVA). A
mediation analysis (Hayes & Preacher, 2014) was per-
formed to predict intrusions with vantage perspective,
self-relevance, negative mood, and state-anxiety. The
indirect effects were calculated with the PROCESS
macro function of SPSS. Accordingly, separate
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mediation models were run for each mediator. One
dummy variable was created to represent the exper-
imental conditions of field and observer perspective
(1 = field, 0 = observer). The control condition was
left out of this analysis because participants in the
control condition recalled personal memories
instead of memories of their trauma imagery. So
their memories were per definition highly self-rel-
evant. Testing how self-relevance mediates the
relationship between perspective and intrusions in
the control condition in comparison to the other con-
ditions would therefore have introduced a methodo-
logical confound. The level of significance was set at
α = 0.05. Pairwise comparisons following significant
F-test results were corrected for multiple comparisons
using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels (dividing the
threshold of 0.05 by the number of comparisons).
The effect sizes reported are Cohen’s f. See Table 1
for descriptive statistics.
Control measures
Individual differences
The three conditions did not statistically differ with
respect to age, F(2, 74) = 0.14, p = .87, educational
level, χ2 (2) = 4.78, p = .31, trait-anxiety (STAI-T), F(2,
74) = 0.96, p = .38, spontaneous use of imagery in
daily life (SUIS), F(2, 74) = .72, p = .49, baseline negative
mood (MoodQ), F(2, 74) = 1.13, p = .33, or state-anxiety
(STAI-S), F(2, 74) = 1.37, p = .26.
Demand and compliance
The diary compliance was good (M = 1.86, SD = 2.23;
reversed score) and did not differ between conditions
F(2, 74) = 1.24, p = .29. None of the participants sus-
pected the goal of the study.
Manipulation checks
Trauma analogue induction
There were no significant differences between the
conditions in the level of distress and vividness of
the eyewitness report, F(2, 74) = .69, p = .51, and F(2,
74) = 1.36, p = .26, respectively. The attention ratings
for the report were overall high (M = 8.30, SD = 1.10)
and this did not differ significantly between con-
ditions, F(2, 74) = 2.46, p = .09.
Trauma analogue recall
A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .008 was used.
Participants in the field perspective and control
conditions were significantly better at maintaining
the instructed perspective during recall, F(2, 74) =
10.46, p < .001, f = 0.53, and also found this easier
than participants in the observer perspective con-
dition, F(2, 74) = 7.81, p≤ .001, f = 0.46. The mean
scores show that the percentage of time participants
were able to maintain their perspective during recall
was lowest in the observer condition. However statisti-
cally, there was no difference between the conditions
F(2, 74) = 2.46, p = .09. There were no significant differ-
ences between conditions in the extent to which par-
ticipants believed that their perspective affected the
content of the recall, F(2, 74) = 4.23, p = .02, and the
emotional richness of the image, F(2, 74) = 4.48,
p≤ .02. No significant differences between the con-
ditions were found in richness of detail of the image,
F(2, 74) = 1.31, p = .28.
Experimental measures
Emotional impact
A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .025 was used.
The effect of the Trauma Analogue Recall on negative
mood (MoodQ) was assessed with a 3 Time (baseline,
post-induction, post-recall) × 3 Condition (field, obser-
ver, control) mixed ANOVA with Time as within-
subject factor and Condition as between-subjects
factor, and the MoodQ score as the dependent vari-
able. There was a significant main effect of Time, F(2,
74) = 83.12, p < .001, f = 1.06, Condition F(2, 74) =
10.55, p < .001, f = .53, and a significant Condition ×
Time interaction effect, F(4, 74) = 15.13, p < .001, f
= .64. A similar analysis with state anxiety (STAI-S) as
dependent variable showed a significant main effect
of Time, F(2, 74) = 36.18, p < .001, f = .70, a significant
main effect of Condition, F(2, 74) = 6.09, p < .005, f
= .41, and a significant Time × Condition interaction
effect, F(4, 74) = 5.05, p < .005, f = .37. Between
groups there were no significant effects for the base-
line and post-induction measures on negative mood
and state-anxiety, all F(2, 74),≥ 0.44, all p≥ .260.
However, for the post-recall, field perspective signifi-
cantly yielded the highest levels of negative mood
and state-anxiety in comparison to observer and
control conditions, respectively, F(2, 74) = 24.77, p
< .001, f = 0.82, and F(2, 74) = 9.46, p≤ .001, f = 0.51.
Self-relevance
There was a significant difference between conditions
in the self-relevance of the recalled image, F(2, 74) =
3.23, p = .05, f = 0.29. Contrasts showed that
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participants in the control condition rated their image
as more self-relevant than participants in the observer
perspective condition, p = .02. There were no other
significant differences.
Intrusions
Because the count data of the intrusions displayed high
overdispersion, a negative binomial regression with
vantage perspective as predictor variable (with the
control group as the reference group) and intrusion fre-
quency (measured with the diary) as the dependent
variable was performed (Anscombe, 1949). The dis-
persion parameter included in the model was default.
The goodness of fit was good, X2 (73) = 2.98. In com-
parison to a model without any predictors, this
overall model was a significant improvement, X2 (2, N
= 77) = 8.92, p = .01. Overall, vantage perspective was
a significant predictor of intrusions, X2 (2, N = 77) =
8.44, p = 0.15. Compared to the control group, field per-
spective increased the frequency of intrusions with b
= .82, X2 (1, N = 77) = 6.51, p = .01. Compared to the
observer group, field perspective also increased intru-
sions with b = .80, X2 (1, N = 77) = 6.10, p = .01.
However, there was no significant effect for the obser-
ver perspective in comparison to the control group, b =
0.22, X2(1, N = 77)= .005, p = .95.
An ANOVA with vantage perspective as indepen-
dent variable and the IES-Intrusion subscale as the
dependent variable also showed a significant differ-
ence between conditions, F(2, 74) = 4.71, p = .02, f =
0.36. Contrasts showed that participants in the field
perspective condition scored significantly higher on
the IES-Intrusion scale than participants in the obser-
ver perspective and control conditions, p = .05. There
was no significant difference between the observer
perspective and the control condition, p = .28.
Mediation analysis
Following the procedure byHayes and Preacher (2014),
it was tested if negative mood (post-recall), state-
anxiety (post-recall), and self-relevance mediated the
relationship between vantage perspective and
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of control and experimental measures across and within conditions.
Field
condition
Observer
condition
Control
condition Total
Measure M SD M SD M SD M SD
Age 21.04 2.19 21.27 2.62 21.48 3.88 21.27 2.98
Education University 24 – 25 – 25 –
HBO* 0 – 0 – 1 –
Other 0 – 1 – 1 –
STAI-T 39.21 4.84 37.19 4.41 38.00 6.07 38.10 5.17
SUIS 42.00 3.91 40.31 6.22 41.30 4.54 41.18 4.99
Distress of report 5.54 1.93 5.31 2.13 5.93 1.73 5.60 1.93
Vividness of report 7.54 1.06 7.08 1.32 7.56 1.16 7.39 1.19
Self-relevance 5.04 2.37 3.73 3.11 5.41 1.93 4.73 2.58
Attention 8.13 0.99 8.23 1.18 8.52 1.19 8.30 1.10
Diary compliance 2.04 2.16 1.31 2.02 2.22 2.45 1.86 2.23
MoodQ Baseline 7.79 4.28 6.19 3.66 7.52 4.23 7.16 4.07
Post-
induction
16.91 3.55 16.03 2.74 17.15 6.35 16.70 4.51
Post-recall 19.71 7.09 12.46 5.99 7.33 5.76 12.92 8.00
STAI-S Baseline 35.67 4.86 33.46 4.15 34.44 5.06 34.49 4.73
Post-
induction
42.71 3.76 42.88 4.05 41.89 8.28 42.48 5.77
Post-recall 42.04 8.40 36.04 8.26 32.07 7.96 36.52 9.07
IES-Intrusion 5.65 2.79 2.96 2.90 3.89 3.57 4.11 3.27
Visual intrusions diary 2.43 3.31 1.08 2.73 .70 1.24 1.36 2.60
Combination intrusions diary 3.04 5.47 1.38 4.88 1.70 2.35 2.00 4.37
Visual and combination intrusions diary 5.48 6.62 2.46 7.36 2.41 3.20 3.36 6.03
Percentage of time the perspective was
maintained
81.25 11.54 72.12 15.50 78.89 17.61 77.34 15.51
Strength of the vantage perspective 5.58 0.78 4.50 0.95 5.44 1.01 5.17 1.03
Ease of maintaining the perspective 5.42 0.93 4.00 1.33 4.93 1.52 4.77 1.40
Degree to which vantage perspective
influenced the content of the image
4.92 1.41 4.35 1.65 3.63 1.67 4.27 1.65
Richness of details of recalled image 4.92 1.02 4.46 1.42 4.37 1.33 4.57 1.28
Richness of emotions of recalled image 4.58 1.18 4.04 1.40 3.48 1.34 4.01 1.37
*Higher vocational education.
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intrusions measured with the IES-intrusions subscale
and the diary. Confirming step 1 of the mediation
analysis, vantage perspective significantly predicted
IES-intrusions, b = 2.66, t(48) = 3.33, p < .01, but not
intrusions measured with the diary, b = 1.62, t(47) =
1.50, p = .14. In line with step 2, vantage perspective
was a significant predictor of negative mood, b =
7.25, t(48) = 3.91, p < .001, and state-anxiety, b = 6.00,
t(48) = 2.55, p < .01, but not of self-relevance, b = 1,31,
t(48) = 1.67, p = .10. This means that self-relevance
was not a mediator.
Confirming step 3, negativemood and state-anxiety
were significant predictors of IES-intrusions, respect-
ively, b = .21, t(47) = 3.71, p < .001, and b = .12, t(47) =
2.65, p < .05. The indirect effects were tested using
the effect method with 95% bias-corrected bootstrap
confidence intervals (CI) for the relative indirect
effects (based on 5.000 bootstrap samples). The indir-
ect coefficient for negative mood was significant, b =
1.49, SE = .58, CI = .581 to 2.906. For state-anxiety the
indirect coefficient was significant, b = .73, SE = .40, CI
= .154 to 1.829. Consistent with full mediation,
vantage perspective was no longer a significant predic-
tor of intrusions when taking into account negative
mood as a mediator, b = .17, t(47) = 1.43, p = .16.
Vantage perspective was still significant when taking
into account state-anxiety as a mediator, b = 1.92, t
(47) = 2.40, p < .05. In a multiple mediation model
with state-anxiety and negative mood simultaneously
entered in the model, negative mood was the only sig-
nificant predictor, b = .18, t(47) = 2.51, p = .02, and
state-anxiety was not, b = .04, t(47) = 0.68, p = .50. This
means that field perspective was associated with
higher levels of negative mood, and state-anxiety and
this subsequently resulted in higher levels of intrusions.
See Figure 1 for a graphic illustration.
Discussion
Our first hypothesis was that distressing memories
from field perspective would elicit the highest levels
of negative mood, state-anxiety, and intrusions in
the short term, compared to the observer perspective
and control groups (hypothesis 1). Our results indeed
show that recalling a distressing image from field per-
spective resulted in higher levels of negative mood,
state-anxiety, and intrusions, relative to using observer
perspective. This is consistent with the earlier findings
of the studies of McIsaac and Eich (2002) and Berntsen
and Rubin (2006). We observed that participants in the
observer perspective condition, showed comparable
levels of negative mood, state-anxiety, and intrusions
as participants in the control perspective condition.
The control condition controlled for adopting obser-
ver perspective.
In terms of the underlying mechanism, we
theorised that field perspective would result in more
intrusions compared to the observer perspective
because it makes the memory more self-relevant
(hypothesis 2) (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) and
increases the emotional impact of the memory
(hypothesis 3). Our second hypothesis was not
confirmed, as recall in the control condition was
rated as most self-relevant, with no significant differ-
ences between the field and observer perspective.
Also, in contrast to our expectations, self-relevance
did not mediate the relation between vantage per-
spective and intrusions. Interestingly, a previous
study on memory encoding, revealed that imagery
experienced from observer perspective was rated as
less self-relevant (Mooren et al., 2016). So perhaps
the interaction between vantage perspective and
self-relevance acts differently at different moments
of encoding and retrieval.
Our third hypothesis was that the emotional
impact of recall (which was higher in the field perspec-
tive condition) results in more intrusions in the short-
term. For this hypothesis we found evidence since
negative mood (post-recall) fully, and state-anxiety
(post-recall) partially, mediated the relation between
vantage perspective and intrusion frequency
(measured with IES-intrusions scale). That is, field per-
spective increased the emotional distress associated
with the image relative to observer perspective,
which subsequently increased intrusion frequency.
This finding is in line with cognitive models of PTSD
(Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Ehlers & Clark,
2000) proposing that negative affective responses
post-trauma predict intrusion development. This
suggests that field perspective, relative to observer
perspective, results in more intrusions, not because
it makes the memory more self-relevant, but rather
Figure 1. Standardized regression coefficients for the relation
between vantage perspective and intrusions as mediated by negative
mood, * p < .01, ** p < .001
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because it increases negative mood and state-anxiety.
It should be noted that our effects were only found for
intrusions measured with the IES-intrusions subscale
and not with the diary measures. This suggests that
the effects are primarily applicable to the overall
experience of intrusions, rather than visual intrusions
in specific (as measured with the diary).
In clinical practice, recall from observer perspective
is often seen as an emotional avoidance strategy.
Indeed, recall from observer perspective after trauma
in patients can result in more PTSD symptoms such
as intrusions over longer periods of time (Kenny
et al., 2009). Recalling from observer perspective
might therefore only result in fewer intrusions in the
short-term, whereas in the long-term it could
become an avoidant coping strategy resulting in the
maintenance of PTSD symptoms. Another possibility
is that using observer perspective is dysfunctional in
real-life trauma but not necessarily in experimental
analogue trauma, where the memory is not necess-
arily self-relevant or threatening and could more
easily be forgotten without consequence. In support
of this idea, it was found that a clinical population of
PTSD patients naturalistically use observer perspective
when recalling their traumatic memories, whereas
non-clinical participants recalled their traumatic mem-
ories from field perspective (Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin,
2003). Thus, observer perspective may only serve an
avoidant distancing function in PTSD.
The present study has several limitations that are
noteworthy. Although the imagery recall method we
used (e.g. Trauma Analogue Induction) has proven
successful in inducing analogue traumatic stress
symptoms, we cannot generalise our results to
actual trauma or clinical populations. It should be
noted that an imaginary event, as opposed to a
remembered traumatic event, may not translate to
actual trauma PTSD. This limits the ecological validity
of our study and the generalisation of our conclusions
to clinical populations and autobiographical experi-
ences. Also, it might be explored what kind of ana-
logue trauma situations are easier to imagine (e.g.
watching another person involved in an accident or
being the victim). Furthermore, the timing of the
experimental manipulation might have occurred
during memory consolidation since there was only a
brief time (± 5 minutes) between encoding and the
experimental manipulation. As such, it cannot be
ruled out that the manipulation influenced how the
images of the report were encoded. Another potential
issue is that all participants were trained in field
perspective before listening to the recording. After-
wards, they were asked to adopt a specific vantage
perspective as the experimental manipulation. Thus,
participants in the field perspective condition were
trained in their perspective but participants in the
observer perspective condition and the control con-
dition were not. Although the results indicate that
the manipulation was successful for all instructed per-
spectives, future studies could consider a training in
both perspectives for all participants. Finally, it
should be noted that the mediation analysis was run
with a sample size of only 50 cases. A small sample
size can reduce the statistical power and the likelihood
that a statistically significant result reflects a true
effect.
Future research might investigate the interaction
between negative mood, state-anxiety and vantage
perspective on intrusion development in order to
test predictions from cognitive models of PTSD
(Brewin et al., 1996; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). An important
question is when or in which context recalling distres-
sing memories from field perspective is functional in
order to regulate emotions and under what conditions
it is better to use observer perspective. Our results
might be relevant for trauma victims who receive
some kind of debriefing directly after the event
occurred. Victims of car-accidents who initially
reported high intrusion and avoidance symptoms
remained symptomatic when they received a deb-
riefing (Mayou et al., 2000). It might be relevant to
examine whether the instructions of the debriefing
are stimulating either field or observer perspective,
and how this affects trauma recovery. Given our
results, we suggest that adopting an observer per-
spective directly after the traumatic event (i.e. during
memory consolidation) might be effective in dampen-
ing initial emotional arousal and preventing intrusion
development. However, when the memory is already
consolidated, adopting an observer perspective
might function as an avoidance strategy that even-
tually maintains PTSD symptoms such as intrusions.
Based on our results, this is an empirically based sug-
gestion. Further studies are required to find out a
possible theoretical reason for this, possibly focusing
on fundamental memory processes and meaning
making.
In conclusion, our study showed that recalling a
distressing image from field perspective resulted in
more intrusions than recalling from observer perspec-
tive and a control condition. Negative mood fully
mediated and state-anxiety partially mediated the
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relation between vantage perspective and intrusions,
where field perspective increased negative mood
and state-anxiety relative to observer perspective,
accounting for the difference in intrusion frequency.
Replication of our findings is necessary to test their
robustness, and more research into the interaction
between vantage perspective at encoding/recall and
emotional distress effects is warranted.
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